Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and Mentally Disabled Would-be Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues by MacIntosh, Constance
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Immigration Issue Article 6 
4-1-2019 
Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and Mentally Disabled 
Would-be Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues 
Constance MacIntosh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Constance MacIntosh, “Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and Mentally Disabled Would-be 
Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues” (2019) 42:1 DLJ 125. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
D
A
L
H
O
U
S
IE
 L
A
W
 J
O
U
R
N
A
L
93
DALHOUSIE 
LAW 
JOURNAL
Volume 42 Number 1 Spring 2019
Immigration
The Battle for the Wrong Mistake:  Risk Salience in
Canadian Refugee Status Decision-making
 Hilary Evans Cameron
Immigration, Xenophobia and Equality Rights
 Donald Galloway
Once More unto the Breach:  Confronting the Standard of
Review (Again) and the Imperative of Correctness Review
when Interpreting the Scope of Refugee Protection
 Gerald Heckman and Amar Khoday
Do the Means Change the Ends?  Express Entry and
Economic Immigration in Canada
 Asha Kaushal
Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and 
Mentally Disabled Would-be Immigrants:  
Canada’s Story Continues
 Constance MacIntosh
Migrant Workers, Rights, and the Rule of Law:
Responding to the Justice Gap
 Sarah Marsden
Quand voyager mène au renvoi:  analyse critique de la
législation canadienne sur la perte du statut de résident
permanent liée à la perte de l’asile
 Hélène Mayrand
The MV Sun Sea:  A Case Study on the Need for
Greater Accountability Mechanisms at Canada 
Border Services Agency
 Lobat Sadrehashemi
Constance MacIntosh* ? Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically
 and Mentally Disabled Would-be
 Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues
?????????? ?? ???? ???????????? ????????????????????? ? ?? ???????????????????????
??????? ????????????? ??? ? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????????????? ??????? ??? ????
????????? ??? ?????? ??????????????? ????? ??????? ??????????? ??? ? ??????????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????????????????????????
???????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ???
????????????????????????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????? ??
??????????????????????????? ?????????CRPD?????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????? ????????????????
?????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???????? ????? ???????? ????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
??? ?????? ????????? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?? ?? ???? ???? ????? ???? ???? ? ?? ?????? ???????????
?????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????? ????
??????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????? ???
??????????????? ? ????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ????????????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????????????????????? ????
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ??
?????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
??????CRDPH??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
??? ??????????????????????????? ??????? ??? ??????????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ?? ???
?????? ????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ??? ?? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ???? ???? ????? ???
??????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????? ?????
??????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????
?????????????????????????
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????????????????????
????????????
I.? ???????????????????????????????
II.? ??????????????????????????????????????
1.? ??????????????????????????????
??????????
????????????
In April 2018, Canada’s federal government announced that it had decided 
“to eliminate” the medical inadmissibility policy from our immigration 
regime.1 This was to bring our practices in line with contemporary 
Canadian values, and to engender consistency with the ??????????? ???
???? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? ???????????? (????),2 that Canada signed 
in 2007 and rati? ed in 2010. The ???? requires equality for persons 
with disabilities, including taking actions to enable full and effective 
participation and inclusion in society.3 To achieve these obligations, states 
must adopt legislative or other measures that implement these rights, and 
must repeal or revise legislation or policies which are inconsistent with the 
????’s obligations.4
Canadian law has long had provisions that speci? cally consider, or 
require, rejecting potential immigrants based on grounds that are linked 
to health conditions and perceived intellectual and physical disabilities. 
Although the announced goal was eliminating the policy, the government 
news release indicated that this would not happen immediately. Rather, 
further collaboration with provinces and territories was required to 
understand the effects of a repeal, because these levels of government hold 
responsibility for providing access to health and social services for their 
residents. In the short term, however, the federal government committed 
1. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada 
brings medical inadmissibility policy in line with inclusivity for persons with disabilities” (16 April 
2018), online: ?????????????????????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ?????? <www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/news.html>.
2. ??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? ????????????, 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 44910 
(entered into force 3 May 2008) [????].
3. ????, ????, art 3.
4. ????, ????, art 4.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
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to immediately implementing interim changes to “bring the policy in line 
with Canadian values on supporting the participation of persons with 
disabilities in society, while continuing to protect publicly funded health 
and social services.”5 
The Canadian immigration regime has many unique features. One is 
that the Minister has statutory authority to grant exemptions unilaterally 
to potential immigrants on public policy grounds, where the immigrant is 
otherwise inadmissible pursuant to some term of the legislative regime.6
Acting under this power, a new policy on medical inadmissibility was 
formally revealed and implemented on 1 June 2018,7 with its termination 
date being when the contemplated changes to the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations come into force.
The new policy does introduce some signi? cant changes. As returned 
to below, under the current regime, when assessing a potential immigrant 
who seeks to immigrate as a member of the economic class,8 the regime 
requires a calculation of that person’s likely use of public health and social 
services, as well as the use by accompanying family members. Prior to 1 
June 2018, a person would be deemed inadmissible on medical grounds 
if they were assessed as likely to have a draw on health or social services 
that was above the national average per capita draw, over a 5 or 10 year 
period following the medical exam for immigration screening. The new 
policy raises the ? scal medical inadmissibility bar to $19,812/year; that is, 
three times the deemed average of $6,604.9 It also narrows the list of social 
services that will be included when making the calculation. In particular, 
Canada will now exclude the costs of providing a potential immigrant 
or their family member with publicly supported special education, social 
5. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, supra note 1.
6. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c27, s 25(2) [IRPA].
7. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Temporary Public Policy Regarding Excessive 
Demand on Health and Social Services (Public Policy update), (1 June 2018), online: Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada Public Policies <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/excessive-demand-
june-2018.html>.
8. Section 12 of the IRPA identi? es three classes under which a person can immigrate. They 
are the family class, where the key criteria is having a family relationship with a Canadian citizen 
or permanent resident, the economic class, which turns on the applicant’s potential to become 
economically established, and the refugee class, which encompasses persons who meet criteria for 
asylum.
9. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Excessive demand on health services 
and on social services (Operational instructions and guidelines), online: Immigration, Refugees 
and Citizenship Canada Publications and Manuals <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/standard-requirements/
medical-requirements/refusals-inadmissibility/excessive-demand-on-health-social-services.html>.
???? ?????????????????????????
and vocational rehabilitation services, and personal support services. 
The reason that Canada provided for narrowing the list of social services 
was that “these services should…be seen as investments that enable 
participation and inclusion.”10 
The language of inclusion and participation signals a foundational 
shift in Canada’s approach to disability and immigration. It would seem 
to suggest implementing a social model of disability. Within a social 
model, disability is the product of social, structural and environmental 
barriers, which cause persons with physical or mental impairments to be 
unable to effectively participate in society on an equal basis with others.11
As disability is the result of public practices, there is a collective social 
obligation to address disabling barriers.
Despite this positive shift, the new policy does not completely 
embrace a social model of disability. The policy still operates to preserve 
and perpetuate some problematic norms and narratives about human 
worth. These norms and narratives have their roots in Canada’s historic 
practices, which re? ected stereotyping, social stigma, and eugenics-
informed thinking, about what makes a person a worthwhile citizen and 
what deserves moral or social condemnation. These roots are ugly. Writing 
with regard to the disability provisions, Judith Mosoff observes that “the 
same ideological mechanisms which keep Canadians with disabilities and 
their families ‘outsiders’ to the bene? ts of the Canadian state operate in a 
more direct way to keep people with disabilities outside Canada.”12 This 
article joins the scholarship on how migration law brings social values 
and prejudices into high relief.13 It shines a light on how historic logics 
continue to quietly inform current practice, and identi? es and denounces 
their persistent and prejudicial vestigial structural in? uences.14 To this 
end, I ? rst discuss the evolution of the medical inadmissibility regime, 
10. ?????????????????????????????? note 7.
11. ????, ????? note 2 at Preamble. See also Paul Harpur, “ Embracing the New Disability Rights 
Paradigm: The Importance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2012) 27:1 
Disability & Society 1. For a discussion of how the social model of disability is becoming prominent in 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, see Ravi Malhotra, “ Has the Charter Made a Difference 
for People with Disabilities? Re? ections and Strategies for the 21st Century” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 
273.
12. Judith Mosoff, “Excessive Demand on the Canadian Conscience: Disability, Family and 
Immigration” (1999) 26 Man LJ 149 at para 2.
13. See, e.g., Lindsay Ferguson, “Constructing and Containing the Chinese Male: Quong-Wing and 
the King and the Saskatchewan Act to Prevent the Employment of Female Labour” (2002) 65 Sask L 
Rev 549.
14. See, e.g., the exposé of race and gender devaluing through the evolution of domestic worker 
programs, even when the programs appeared to have developed neutral or objective criteria, in Audrey 
Macklin, “Foreign Domestic Worker: Surrogate Housewife or Mail Order Servant?” (1992) 37:3 
McGill LJ 681.
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the values that it has advanced, and how prejudices were buried under 
what appear to be structurally neutral frameworks. I then re? ect on the 
regime that was in place prior to June 2018, before turning to how the new 
policy fails the disabled community by continuing to perpetuate a ? scal 
calculus of human worth and leaving the heart of the problematic historic 
framework in place.
 I. The historic unwanted immigrant
The admissibility of would be immigrants has historically turned, in part, 
on matters such as whether the applicant was perceived to have a health 
condition or physical or mental disability which were identi? ed as ? agging 
them as undesirable or burdensome citizens. This approach re? ected, in 
part, what has come to known as a ‘medical’ model of disability. Under this 
view or model, any mental or physical barriers to full societal participation 
are taken as resulting from individualized and private de? cits or defects. 
Thus it is the individual who is the source of the problem, and society 
may or may not exercise discretion to ‘help’ the individual, with such help 
being laced with a scent of charity. A related and overlapping model, the 
‘economic model’, makes the costs of inclusion the primary concern.15 Its 
focus is thus on supporting people with disabilities to enter the workforce, 
so that they will be less likely to draw upon public support.16 These 
contrast with the social model, where participatory de? cits are identi? ed 
as arising due to the interaction of impairments with social structures and 
assumptions about normalcy. This approach places the onus on the public 
and society to shift their expectations about who populates the polity, and 
make decisions and structure society to remove barriers, accordingly.17 
Early legislation, which was in place until 1906, squarely re? ected 
a medicalized model, and was coupled with a moralizing ideology. It 
erected blunt bars against potential migrants who had mental illnesses, 
or perceived physical or intellectual disabilities, framed within the 
stigmatizing language of being a “lunatic, Idiot, Deaf and Dumb, Blind or 
In? rm Person.”18 The legislation also precluded the landing of persons with 
any “loathsome, dangerous or infectious disease or malady,”19 with the 
15. Mosoff, supra note 12 at para 6.
16. Ibid at para 36.
17. Tom Shakespeare, “The Social Model of Disability” in Lennard Davis, ed, The Disability Studies 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 2013) 214 at 216.
18. An Act respecting Emigrants and Quarantine, CSC 1859, c 40, s 10(2). 
19. Ibid. 
???? ?????????????????????????
term “loathsome” being borrowed from American practice.20 According to 
a 1910 American publication, drafted to guide medical exams of would-be 
immigrants, a “loathsome disease” is “a disease which excites abhorrence 
in others by reason of the knowledge of its existence,”21 essentially coming 
down to highly socially stigmatized diseases such as syphilis.22 
The bar against those with perceived mental or physical impairments 
provided for exceptions under two circumstances that signalled part of 
the bar’s driving ideology. The exceptions were if the individual was 
accompanied by family who could be expected to provide for them, or if 
a $300 bond was posted on their behalf. This second exception imposed a 
rather daunting disability head tax, given that the average income for an 
industrial worker in Canada in 1901 was about one-tenth of this amount, 
a mere $35 a year.23 There was thus an assumption that these individuals 
could never be self-supporting, which in some instances may have been 
true given the social prejudice of the time, but it is clearly an unreasonable 
universalization. 
In 1910, Canada began distinguishing perceived mental illness or 
intellectual disabilities from physical disabilities. Fiscal concerns also 
fell into the shadows, and other ideological concerns surfaced more 
expressly. In particular, Canadian law now vili? ed mental or intellectual 
disabilities by imposing an absolute ban on persons who were “idiots, 
imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, and persons 
who had been insane within ? ve years previous.”24 (At this time, epilepsy 
was understood to be an inheritable mental illness.25) The impenetrable 
bar against those with a “loathsome disease, or with a disease which is 
contagious or infectious, or which may become dangerous to public health” 
remained ? rmly in place.  Canada also introduced new bars against those 
convicted of crimes involving “moral turpitude,” “prostitutes,” and persons 
20. Angus McLaren, “Stemming the Flood of Defective Immigrants” in Barrington Walker, ed, The 
History of Racism and Immigration in Canada: Essential Readings (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ 
Press, 2008) 189 at 195. 
21. As cited in Amy Fairchild, Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the 
Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labour Workforce (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2003) at 23.
22. See, Donna Manfredi & Judith Riccardi, “AIDS and United States Immigration Policy: Historical 
Stigmatization Continues with the Latest Loathsome Disease” (1992) 7:2 St John’s J Leg Comment 
707.
23. “Census of Canada, 1901” (last modi? ed 19 February 2019), online: Library and Archives 
Canada <www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/census/1901/pages/about-census.aspx>.
24. Immigration Act (An Act respecting Immigration), SC 1910, c 27, s 3(a).
25. Ena Chadha, “‘Mentally Defectives’ Not Welcome: Mental Disability in Canadian Immigration 
Law, 1859–1927” (2008) 28:1 Disability Studies Quarterly (text associated with footnote 56).
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who “procure prostitutes,”26 where both crime and prostitution were seen 
as evidence of “feeble-mindedness”27 and thus a mental impairment. 
Finally, Canada maintained a presumptive bar against those who 
are “dumb, blind or otherwise physically defective” unless a Board of 
Inquiry concluded that they were not likely to become a “public charge” 
due to having an accompanying family, showing suf? cient funds in hand 
or having a “legitimate mode of earning a living.” This third exception 
thus permitted admission to disabled persons who had already learned, for 
example, a speci? c trade. Such scrutiny was not extended to those who 
appeared able-bodied on landing, who did not have to refute a presumption 
that they were incapable of being self-supporting.
This early treatment showed concerns with contagion resulting in a bar 
against those with perceived infectious diseases. It illustrates an assumption 
that those with a physical impairment would become a public charge, but 
offered such individuals or their families something of an opportunity 
to refute that presumption. It also shows unmitigated disdain for those 
with mental illnesses or intellectual impairment, or those whose disease 
met with moral condemnation from others. The entry of these people was 
blocked regardless of whether they had a family to care for them, a means 
to earn a livelihood, or the ability to post a bond. Unlike other would-
be immigrants who, if rejected, could pay $20 to bring an appeal to the 
Minister, those who were denied entry on the basis of a loathsome disease 
or being an “idiot, imbecile, feeble-minded” an epileptic or insane, had no 
right of appeal.28 
The exclusion of those with mental or intellectual disabilities or who 
had a socially stigmatized disease was divorced from any basis in ? scal 
concerns about individuals becoming a public charge. The simple truth is 
that no amount of money was enough to purchase the mentally impaired 
or mentally ill, or those with a socially condemned disease, a dispensation 
from their social stigma.
There were only two modi? cations of note to the medical inadmissibility 
provisions between 1910 and 1955. The ? rst was to introduce a bar in 1919 
against those who were not already excluded under another listed category, 
if they were either “mentally or physically defective to such a degree as 
to affect their ability to earn a living.”29 In this manner, the attempt to 
name all speci? c offending conditions, impairments, or diagnoses was 
26. Supra note 24, ss 3(d)-(f).
27. Angus McLaren, supra note 20 at 196.
28. Immigration Act, supra note 24, ss 18 & 19.
29. An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, SC 1919, c 25, s 3.
???? ?????????????????????????
supplemented by a catch-all phrase which went back to ? scal concerns. 
At this point, those with perceived physical disabilities could be banned, 
regardless of family support. As I have written elsewhere, this muddled 
treatment is in part about how stereotypes engender panic. It is also about 
the gross devaluation of persons, which was contemporaneously being 
fostered by the eugenics movement.30 This movement sought to eradicate 
those people who were deemed to have weaker genetic stock. What was 
perceived as mental illness or disability was understood at this time to 
be inheritable, and often triggered by immorality31 or a tendency towards 
immorality32 (which was also seen as inheritable). All of this was drawn 
upon to justify the forced sterilization of persons deemed “mentally 
defective” or physically disabled,33 and so of course such people would not 
be desirable as new immigrants. Health and medical conditions served as 
markers to identify morally and physically desirable citizens, standing in 
for a combination of ? scal concerns, wide-spread prejudice, and eugenics-
informed general disdain for human difference.34
Another new element, which has persisted to the present day, was 
introduced in 1952. This provision barred the entire family if one member 
was deemed inadmissible. Persons with physical disabilities could 
nonetheless gain entry if they had family that was already in Canada, and 
who also posted a bond on their behalf.35 However, if a family member 
was an “idiot” or was “insane,” or had a loathsome disease, then the whole 
family was blocked.36 Presumably Canada did not want their genetic stock 
taking hold on Canadian soil.
Our prohibitions remained essentially the same until 1976. Labels 
or diagnosis could completely determine admissibility, with no regard to 
30. For a discussion of how eugenics informed arguments were used to foster support for legislative 
reform in the context of sexual sterilization of those who were deemed “mentally defective,” see 
Timothy Caul? ed & Gerald Robertson, “Eugenic Policies in Alberta: From the Systematic to the 
Systemic?” (1996) 35:1 Alta L Rev 59.
31. Constance MacIntosh, “Wealth Meets Health: Disabled Immigrants and Calculations of 
‘Excessive Demand’” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health Law at the Supreme Court of 
Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 293 at 303-304.
32. Ibid.
33. Jennifer Chandler, “The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame and 
Social Solidarity” (2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 831 at paras 47-48.
34. For similar assessments of these provisions, see Judith Mosoff, supra note 12; Robert Menzies, 
“Governing Mentalities: The Deportation of ‘Insane’ and ‘Feebleminded’ Immigrants Out of British 
Columbia from Confederation to World War II” (1998) 13 CJLS 135; Rose Voyvodic, “Into the 
Wasteland: Applying Equality Principles to Medical Inadmissibility in Canadian Immigration Law” 
(2001) 16 J L & Soc’y 115; Ena Chadha, supra note 25.
35. Immigration Act, RSC 1952, c 325, s 5(c).
36. Ibid, s 5(o).
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cost, availability of treatment, or the severity of a person’s impairments.37
As discussed in the next section, the changes which were introduced in 
1976 directly inform today’s legislation, including the 2018 policy. 
 II. The contemporary undesirable immigrant
In 1976, our legislation was revised. Gone was reference to “loathsome 
diseases.” Instead Canada just had a bar for those who were a danger of 
public health or safety,38 ostensibly doing away with viewing health as 
re? ecting moral character and instead focusing on health conditions as 
issues of public safety and well-being. That said, it is notable that the 
conditions that have been listed as threats to public health have had a high 
preponderance of sexually transmitted infections such as syphilis, despite 
the limited evidence supporting screening for syphilis due to public 
health risks.39 Canada also stopped compiling a list of undesirable health 
conditions or statuses, and instead introduced a ? scal calculation model, 
and with this a veneer of ideological neutrality. Potential immigrants would 
now be assessed to determine if they had a “disease, disorder, disability 
or other health impairment“ that “might reasonably be expected to cause 
excessive demands…on health or…social services.”40 This provision 
attracted some litigation. The ? rst case to challenge the constitutionality 
of the provision on Charter grounds was Chesters v Canada (MCI).41
This decision continues to be referenced for its ? nding that the excessive 
demands provision withstands constitutional scrutiny, despite changes to 
the wording of the provision in 2001.42
Chesters was brought by a woman with multiple sclerosis, which had 
in turn resulted in multiple physical disabilities. She sought to immigrate as 
37. Mosoff, supra note 12 at 155.
38. Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976–77, c 52, s 19(1)(a)(i).
39. Canada currently only screens for active TB or untreated syphilis. In the 2015 evaluation of 
the immigration health screening program, the rationale for screening for syphilis was described as 
unclear. Questions were raised about why Canada does not screen for polio, measles, Hep A and Hep 
B, avian ? u, and gonorrhoea, nor seek con? rmation of key vaccinations, as such screening would 
address illnesses with more signi? cant consequences for public health. Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada, Evaluation of the Health Screening and Noti? cation Program: Evaluation 
Division (November 2015) at 17-20.
40. Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976-77, c 52, s 19(1)(a)(ii).
41. Chesters v Canada (MCI), 2002 FCT 727 [Chesters].
42. See Covarrubias v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1193 at para 
57 and Barlagne v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FCJ 651 at para 63. 
The provisions withstood a more recent section 15 claim in Deol v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration) 2002 FCA 271 at paras 49-64. However, in Deol the Charter claim also attracted 
concerns about standing, as the claimed discrimination was not against the applicant, but rather 
the person they were sponsoring the immigrate. The other lead decision on the excessive demands 
provision is Hilewitz v Canada; De Jong v Canada, 2005 SCC 57. This decision turned on statutory 
interpretation and did not revisit the question of the constitutionality of the provisions.
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that Canada therefore has the right to require an assessment of ‘potential 
excessive demands on health services.’ The error here is that this right is 
a quali? ed one. In particular, Canada’s discretion is not unfettered. At the 
time the decision was made, it was restrained by the Charter and a common 
law interpretive presumption of respecting the values and principles of 
international law.49 With the 2001 IRPA, the Act is to be construed and 
applied in a manner that “complies with international human rights 
instruments to which Canada is a signatory.”50 Third, Ms. Chesters’ claim 
that the excessive demands assessment is grounded in the stereotyped 
reasoning that people with disabilities will presumptively be a draw on 
the public purse, and not reasonably contribute to that purse through 
their work, was an important argument to consider, given the history of 
this provision. The court’s answer, to assert that economic contributions 
were not legally relevant when assessing family class applicants, was 
inappropriately dismissive and inconsistent with the fact that the negative 
decision was based entirely on cost concerns. Heneghan J’s response 
served to perpetuate the problematic prejudices from which this provision 
was born, and failed to question the structure of our grounds for exclusion. 
In 2001, perhaps in response to the Chesters lawsuit which was on 
going at the time, the wording of this provision was changed to remove 
the explicit focus on impairments and disabilities. In particular, it came 
to state that a person is inadmissible on health grounds “if their health 
condition…might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on 
health or social services.”51 This was the ? rst time since the 1800s that 
Canadian immigration legislation did not explicitly identify people with 
mental or physical impairments or disabilities as undesirable citizens. That 
said, the focus remains on draws to health and social services from health 
conditions, and not, for example, draws that may result from lifestyle 
choices such as heavy smoking or high-risk sports. This is an example of 
how the historic logics linger, continuing quietly to shape contemporary 
practice, despite their insertion into the regime only having occurred due 
to social prejudice and stereotypes.
The process for assessing whether a “health condition” will likely 
result in excessive demands has developed some rigor over time. The 
current practice involves all would-be immigrants undergoing a mandatory 
medical exam, performed by a doctor who has been designated by the 
Canadian government for this purpose. These physicians send the results 
49. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 69-71.
50. IRPA, supra note 6, s A(3)(iii)(f). See also De Guzman v Canada, 2005 FCA 436.
51. IRPA, ibid, s 38(1)(c). The term ‘health condition’ is not de? ned.
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of the exam to one of four regional medical of? ces. The results are then 
reviewed by a Citizenship and Immigration Canada Medical Of? cer. Cases 
where inadmissibility may be an issue are forwarded to a Medical Of? cer 
at the Centralized Medical Admissibility Unit in Ottawa.52 The Medical 
Of? cer will “assess the severity of the illness and the degree of service 
that will be required to treat it” which involves identifying all anticipated 
social services and health treatments relating to the person’s diagnosis, 
usually for the ? ve year period following the exam.53
The Medical Of? cer then provides an opinion letter to the Visa Of? cer, 
who must assess it for its reasonableness. If the Visa Of? cer concludes 
the excessive demand thresholds are crossed, the of? cer must send a 
procedural fairness letter to the applicant, informing them of the ? ndings 
and the right to challenge the ? ndings.
There have been three major changes to the excessive demand 
provisions, one of which is the new policy. These are all discussed below.
The ? rst major change was brought about by litigation over how to 
interpret and calculate ‘excessive demands.’ After the term was introduced 
in 1976, a de? nition grew out of the caselaw, which was then codi? ed in 
the 2001 regulations. It states that excessive demand is a demand on health 
services or social services which is expected to exceed average Canadian 
per capita costs over either a ? ve or ten year period after their medical 
exam, or else could be expected to cause a demand which would add to 
existing waiting lists.54 This ? gure was calculated based on the services 
or health care that the person would have a right to access as a resident of 
a Canadian province. ‘Excessive’ demand is thus $1.00 over the deemed 
average demand, and apparently adding one person to a waiting list. This 
narrow reading of ‘excessive’ stands in sharp contrast to a de? nition that 
had been proposed, but un-proclaimed, in 1992. It would have found 
demands only became ‘excessive’ when they were ? ve times the average 
annual per capita costs.55 Apparently, the lack of implementation of this 
approach was due to provincial concerns about the costs they could incur.56
In 2005, two would-be immigrant families, whose applications were 
denied due to each family including a child with an intellectual disability, 
brought a challenge to the Supreme Court of Canada. Their challenge was 
52. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Building an Inclusive 
Canada: Bringing the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in Step with Modern Values (December 
2017) (Chair: Robert Oliphant) at 9-10.
53. Ibid at 13.
54. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227, s 1(1)(a).
55. Immigration Act, SC 1992, c 45, s 11 (never proclaimed into force) at para 19(1)(ii)(a).
56. Margaret Somerville & Sarah Wilson, “Crossing Boundaries: Travel, Immigration, Human 
Rights and AIDS” (1998) 43:4 McGill LJ 781 at 806.
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not about the excessive demand provision violating equality rights nor its 
arbitrariness. Rather it was with regard to how excessive demands were 
calculated and so turned on proper statutory interpretation. In Hilewitz v 
Canada; De Jong v Canada, the families argued the provision should be 
read to turn on whether a person is likely to actually draw upon public 
social services, not merely whether they would qualify for or be expected 
to need them. The Court agreed that the statute required an individualized 
assessment that took into account the reasonable likelihood of the 
individual using public sources for their social service supports, instead 
of, for example, the family paying for a child to attend a private school, or 
the family hiring private assistance for respite care.57 In other words, the 
families successfully argued that personal wealth should once again play 
a role in assessing whether a person with mental or physical disabilities 
would be a societal burden and thus an undesirable citizen. This decision 
only considered social services because that was at issue for these families. 
The Court did not explicitly consider how to approach whether a person 
was likely to use health services. Given that the Court was persuaded by 
arguments about social services being available privately, or through cost-
recovery programs, it would seem that the logic of Hilewitz could extend 
to health services that are available on a private basis.58 
While the decision brought welcomed respite for some, it continued 
to perpetuate a medical and economic model of disability and illness, 
reducing the potential immigrant to a source of costs created by 
exclusionary policies and practices. It turned on whether the family or 
the state would likely bear responsibility for subsidizing the individual’s 
ability to effectively participate in society or otherwise pay to overcome 
societal barriers. This was despite the Court having received arguments 
from the intervenor Canadian Association for Community Living, which 
57. Hilewitz v Canada; De Jong v Canada, supra note 42 at para 54-57. The case in which this was 
determined only considered persons applying to immigrate under immigration classes that required 
considerable net worth. Subsequent cases clari? ed that this individualized assessment was required 
for all applicants. See Colaco v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 282 at 
para 9.
58. There have been a few cases where parties unsuccessfully argued that Hilewitz applied in terms 
of health care costs, including Srivastava v Canada (MCI), [2008] IADD 1574 and Doel v Canada 
(MCI), 2002 FCJ 949 (CA). In these cases, the decision turned on the operation of the Canada Health 
Act, which requires provinces to provide access to publicly funded health care. The decisions did not 
consider the growing prevalence of private health care, which may expand exponentially if parties 
who are challenging provincial barriers to private health care are successful. See, for example, the 
on-going litigation in British Columbia brought by Cambie Surgeries Corporation, where Cambie 
recently obtained an injunction preventing the enforcement of new provincial legislation prohibiting 
charging for medically necessary services pending the outcome of the litigation. Cambie Surgeries 
Corporation v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 2084.
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was represented by ARCH, a legal clinic that advocates for people with 
disabilities. ARCH grounded the submissions in how the legislation must 
be read in line with equality values and the contributions of those with 
disabilities to society. They also argued that the accessibility barriers which 
impaired persons experience in schools and the workplace are produced 
by societal decisions about who to count as its members. However, the 
Court avoided these principled arguments to make its determination as 
solely a matter of statutory interpretation.59 
In its discussion, the Court characterized the history of our immigration 
exclusion practices as having long re? ected concerns about limited ? scal 
resources. This rational sounding and measured characterization was 
asserted as the dominant narrative of our story of medical exclusions. The 
narrative only modestly re? ected how Canadian history also demonstrates 
moral and societal prejudices about the type of person who has certain types 
of diseases or disabilities. It avoided any meaningful engagement with 
the Canadian practice of marking those with psychosocial or intellectual/
mental impairments as ? at out socially undesirable citizens, who ought 
to be ??? ????? excluded. Indeed, as discussed above, the predecessor 
legislation did not exclude those with psychosocial and intellectual 
disabilities on ? scal grounds—it explicitly excluded them because they 
had such disabilities. Submissions were also made that the Court was 
required by the statute’s interpretive provisions to interpret the clause to be 
consistent with Charter values, and thus go beyond positioning disability 
as something to be viewed in terms of ? scal de? cits.60 The Court did not 
recognize or speak to these submissions. As a result, its set of reasons 
did nothing to displace the notion that potential immigrants ought to be 
subjected to a calculus which only recognizes their likely economic drain 
upon society and not their likely economic, social, political and cultural 
contributions to society, nor their fundamental human rights to not be 
subjected to prejudicial discrimination. What it did, rather, was have the 
perverse outcome of allowing wealthy families to bring disabled family 
members, while excluding families of more modest means.61 This is a 
disturbing re? ection of our society’s values.
Following ????????, when families seek to immigrate and one family 
member is identi? ed as potentially medically inadmissible due to excessive 
59. ????????, ????? note 42 at para 42. See also Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter has failed 
Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 
58:3 McGill LJ 663 at para 62.
60. Constance MacIntosh, ????? note 31 at 312.
61. Judith Mosoff rhetorically condemned such an outcome long before the ???????? decision. 
????????????? note 12 at para 40.
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demands, the family is now invited to prepare a mitigation plan for the 
government, which in the words of the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees 
and Citizenship Canada, is to try “to demonstrate that they will not be a 
burden on Canada.”62 The language of ‘burden’ remains hurtfully front 
and centre. The medical/economic model strips the individual of what they 
give to society and family, leaving them as unwanted charity cases who 
must refute the assumption that they are an inherently problematic human 
being. 
In the mitigation plan, the family is to identify the private sources 
they will draw upon for support, and how they will afford them. If the 
plan is found reasonable, and any likely public costs remain below the per 
capita average, then the individual will be found to not be inadmissible 
after all—the presumption of being a burden is rebutted. In practice, this 
has meant that Canada will only grant entry to those disabled persons, 
or persons with illnesses, who can pay their own way. Neoliberal values 
have returned Canada to the turn of the century model, which was born 
of eugenics and deep social prejudice. Membership in Canada turns on 
being a market citizen and economic participation,63 with mitigation plans 
re? ecting a personalized head tax.
The proposed mitigation plans are not directly enforceable. There 
are two intertwined reasons for this. First, as noted with concern by the 
Evaluation Division of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (“ED”), 
“there is no in-Canada enforcement mechanism to ensure that migrants are 
following their mitigation plans.”64 Enforcement would require addressing 
some interjurisdictional issues. To bene? t from ? scal transfers under 
the Canada Health Act, provinces have enacted legislation to provide 
all permanent residents with equal access to the same provincial health 
services.65 Thus, a province cannot deny access to insured services to any 
person who is eligible for those services.66 Similarly, when it comes to 
social services, access rights turn on provincial residency.67 This places the 
federal government at jurisdictional arms-length. Although no evidence 
62. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation of the Health Screening and 
Noti? cation Program: Evaluation Division (November 2015) at 22.
63. Valentina Capurri, “The Montoya Case: How Neoliberalism Has Impacted Medical 
Inadmissibility in Canada and Transformed Individuals into ‘Citizens Minus’” (2018) 38:1 Disability 
Studies Quarterly.
64. Supra note 62 at 23.
65. Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6, s 7.
66. Eligibility for provincially insured services turns on residing in the province for a prescribed 
period of time, which can be no more than three months. Canada Health Act, ibid, s 2.
67. For example, Employment Support and Income Assistance Regulations NS Reg 174/2018, s 
14(3).
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appears to have surfaced to suggest that families have strayed from 
mitigation plans, the ED has expressed alarm over Canada’s inability 
to directly enforce them. In a report released in 2015, they suggested 
requiring families to post bonds. This practice would expressly revive 
our historic disability headtaxes. An alternative, which was suggested by 
the Immigration Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association, was to 
require permanent residents who entered with mitigation plans to provide 
evidence that they only drew from private sources for support when seeking 
to renew their permanent resident status.68 If the evidence indicates they 
drew on public support after all, then the family could be deemed to have 
misrepresented their intentions. Misrepresentation, in turn, is grounds to 
revoke their permanent residency status,69 and so deportation would then 
follow. 
Both existing practices, and the above suggested changes, re? ect a 
troubling moral order. Immigrants are already largely selected based on 
factors that are intended to predict economic success. They are expected 
to work, and so to pay taxes. (Indeed, under another provision, they can 
lose their right to remain in Canada if they become destitute.70) However, 
some families are welcomed on a promise that they will not seek to draw 
upon the health and social services that their taxes are paying for. They are 
essentially expected to pay twice, with their income going to personally 
supporting family needs and their taxes being given to serve the needs of 
other permanent residents who did not arrive with pre-existing conditions 
or were able-bodied upon their arrival, and Canadian citizens. If Canada 
were to add the suggested bond requirement, then they would be paying 
three times. The burden on the individual family is not just an economic 
one, it is a moral burden as well. Their presence is deemed legitimate 
only insofar as they are willing to exist in Canada as not-quite deserving 
citizens. The cost of ‘inclusion’ as a citizen is accepting discrimination.
A second signi? cant change came about through the 2001 IRPA having 
introduced a category-based exception to the excessive demand provision. 
Prior to 2001, the excessive demands provisions applied to all would-be 
immigrants. After 2001, the provision ceased to apply to persons who are 
sponsored to immigrate as a member of the family class, as either the 
spouse or the dependent child of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident 
68. Supra note 62; Permanent residency status has a ? ve year term. To renew, an individual must 
? le an application, which includes evidence to show that they have complied with certain terms. IRPA, 
supra note 6, ss 28(1) and 27(2).
69. Ibid, IRPA, s. 40(1)(a).
70. IRPA, supra note 6 at s 39.
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the family class in order to overcome their potential inadmissibility.”75
The implication here is that there is something inappropriate about 
persons with health conditions or physical or psychosocial or intellectual 
disabilities meeting a legislated exemption that is intended to support the 
right of family reuni? cation, a right which is also robustly supported in 
international law.76 That said, the suggestion that people may become 
married to, or get adopted by, a Canadian or permanent resident to ? t into 
the exemption represents what can only be speculation which is intended 
to have an in? ammatory impact. It hints of a desperate interest in ? nding 
grounds to exclude the disabled. Indeed, the ED noted they had no evidence 
to support this concern, yet concluded it warranted being ? agged in their 
report. 
The ED’s commitment to avoiding the entry of burdensome 
immigrants, their discursive erasure of the social, cultural, economic and 
political contributions of all immigrants, and their silence on the value of 
family uni? cation or the need to be consistent with international human 
rights law, echo the Supreme Court’s reasoning from a decade earlier in 
????????? As I have written elsewhere with regard to the ?????????decision:
It is hard to imagine the Court would permit such a limited calculation 
of worth to be made about a Canadian citizen with a disability….Where 
non-citizens are involved the starting point is seen as a choice about 
admission, not a choice about how existing members ought to be treated 
in the interest of achieving social equality….[N]on-citizens are seen to 
be seeking the bestowal of a discretionary privilege, not the recognition 
of what must be changed for their inherent social rights to be realized.77
As ? agged at the beginning of this article, the third change of note 
occurred in June of 2018. Parliamentary attention had been brought to 
the excessive demands provision during a review of whether Canadian 
laws were consistent with the United Nations ?????????????? ???????????
????????????????????????????. While the initial review took place before 
Canada rati? ed the Convention in 2010,78 Parliament did not return to 
the issue until 2016. At this time, federal and provincial governments 
began consultations concerning the impacts of the provision. In 2017, the 
75. ???? at 23.
76. The right to family uni? cation is recognized in several international human rights instruments 
which Canada has rati? ed. These include the ?????????????????????????????????????, GA Res 44/25, 
UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), arts 7-10; and the ?????????? ?????????????? ?????
??????, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) , art 16(3). 
77. MacIntosh, ????? note 31 at 313.
78. ????????????????????????????, ????? note 52.
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Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration was charged with 
undertaking a study.79  
 1. The future undesirable citizen
The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration tabled its report 
on the medical inadmissibility excessive demands provision in December, 
2017. It was titled Building an Inclusive Canada: Bringing the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act in Step with Modern Values.80 Through written 
submissions and hearing, the Committee was exposed to extensive 
arguments that the excessive demands provision was inconsistent with the 
equality guarantees of the Charter.81 This position is at odds with the scant 
caselaw, described above, which has considered the Constitutionality of 
the provision. 
It is important to note that 15 years passed between when the decision 
was rendered in Chesters and this report was published. During this time 
period societal understanding about disabilities and prejudicial stereotypes 
has grown. The four year negotiations process for the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) started in 
2002,82 the year that Chesters was released. It had the fastest negotiation 
process for any UN treaty, with a record number of ? rst day signatories 
in 2006, showing that there was a growing recognition of the impact of 
discrimination against persons with disabilities and increasing public and 
state support for inclusion. The submissions that the Committee received 
re? ected and were informed by this changed context, and there were 
growing expectations on Canada, given its rati? cation of the CRPD in 
2010, to comply with it. More broadly, it has been observed in multiple 
forums that the rati? cation has engendered a signi? cant and generalized 
paradigm shift towards a social understanding of disability.83
In its Report, the Committee concluded that while the medical 
inadmissibility provision “is no longer explicitly discriminatory, the 
79. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 
Minutes of Proceedings, 42nd Parl, 3rd Sess, No 74 (16 October 2017).
80. Building an Inclusive Canada, supra note 52.
81. Ibid at 22-25.
82. United Nations, “Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD)” online: United 
Nations—Disability <www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-
persons-with-disabilities.html>.
83. See Hinze v Great Blue Heron Casino, 2011 HRTO 93. In general see Sheila Wildeman, 
“Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 41:1 J L Med Ethics 48; Steven Hoffman, 
Lathika Sritharan & Ali Tejpar, “Is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities Impacting Mental Health Laws and Policies in High-Income Countries? A Case Study of 
Impacts in Canada” (2016) 16:28 BMC Intl Health & Human Rights, online: <bmcinthealthhumrights.
biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12914-016-0103-1>.
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of note was to extend immediately an exception to non-citizens who were 
already employed in Canada. This recommendation was provoked by the 
situation of live-in caregivers,88 who earn the right to apply for permanent 
residency for themselves and their families following the culmination of a 
several year work term in Canada. At that point, the caregiver is screened 
once again for admissibility, and their family members are all screened 
for medical inadmissibility. The Committee heard evidence of live-in 
caregivers or their children being rejected on medical inadmissibility 
grounds after the worker had already ful? lled their work term as they 
sought to claim their reward, due to the worker’s health having changed or 
a family member’s health condition. This outcome betrayed the workers, 
who had earned the right to seek permanent residency by sacri? cing 
their own family to care for the children of others and for persons with 
high medical needs in Canada. The Committee clearly was moved by the 
unfairness of this outcome.
The Report’s recommendations unfortunately lack a suggested 
timeline to complete the consultations and enact a repeal, despite there 
already having been two years of on-going consultations. As well, the 
recommended ‘interim measures’ are both costly and a bit contradictory 
—if the required outcome is elimination, then it is odd to put signi? cant 
resources into improving the training of the medical and visa of? cers 
who make the assessments, changing how costs are calculated, and also 
rewriting manuals and guidelines to make them ‘reader friendly’ for the 
public. These sorts of recommendations only make sense if it is reasonable 
to expect that the repeal will be a long time coming—or may not come 
at all. This is a troubling proposition in light of the Committee having 
identi? ed the provisions as resulting in indirect discrimination against 
vulnerable populations including those with disabilities.
The Minister responded to the Report,89 and subsequently issued a 
policy. Unlike the commitment that the government made in the news 
release, to “eliminate” the excessive demands branch of the medical 
88. Recent changes to this program have revoked the live-in requirement. It remains focused on 
foreign workers proving in home care for children and for persons with medical needs. See Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????, Canada Gazette 
Vol 148, No 48 (29 November 2014) and Ministerial Instruction, ?????????????????? ???? ???? ???????
???????????, Canada Gazette, Vol 148, No 48 (29 November 2014).
89. Government Response, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, House of Commons, 
online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/CIMM/report-15/response-8512-421-328>.
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inadmissibility policy,90 this time the government did not commit to 
repealing the provision. It only committed to undertaking a data gathering 
and consultation process to determine the impacts of eliminating the 
provision. No timeline was indicated for how long this data gathering 
would go for, nor the likely length of time for the consultations. 
The Minister did adopt some of the recommended ‘interim’ changes, 
including a plain-language review of department “products” and exploring 
options for supplementing training. While rejecting the recommendation to 
extend the exemption to persons already working in Canada, the Minister 
indicated an intention to modify how excessive demands are calculated and 
the cost threshold. These modi? cations were described at the beginning of 
this paper. They include tripling the cost threshold, to promote “fairness” 
by facilitating access for persons who require health and social services 
“at a relatively low cost.” The second major modi? cation is to remove 
social services from the cost calculation, which “are critical for promoting 
inclusion” and “[i]nstead of treating these as costs that must be borne by 
society, these should instead be seen as investments to enable participation 
and inclusion.”
The policy includes two lists which clearly indicate what should and 
should not be included when making cost calculations for social services, 
presumably founded on the above identi? ed policy objectives. The list of 
services for which the cost is included in the demand calculation is: 
Social services closely related to health services:
 ? Social services that are provided by a health professional:
?• home care (by a nurse, physiotherapist, respiratory therapist, 
etc.),
?• palliative care,
?• psychological counseling and
?• the provision of devices related to those services.
 ? Medical aids, appliances, and prostheses.
Social services that provide constant supervision and care for those 
who are not able to integrate into society:
 ? Residential facilities (long-term care, substance abuse services, 
etc.)
 ? Day facilities providing constant supervision (respite care, etc.)91
90.  Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “News Release: Government of Canada brings 
medical inadmissibility policy in line with inclusivity for persons with disabilities” (16 April 2018), 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2018/04/government-of-canada-
brings-medical-inadmissibility-policyin-line-with-inclusivity-for-persons-with-disabilities.html>.
91. Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, ??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? (1 June 2018).
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The list of services which will not count when determining excessive 
demand is:
?? special education services (preparation of an individualized 
education plan, educational assistants, etc.)
?? social and vocational rehabilitation services (rehabilitation 
facilities, occupational therapy, behavioural therapy, speech-
language therapy, etc.)
?? personal non-professional support services means services such 
as assistance with activities of daily living (bathing, dressing, 
feeding, etc.), meal preparation, house cleaning, etc.
?? provision of devices related to those services.92
On the one hand, this list is heartening. The items which are excluded from 
the cost calculations are all associated with matters which support enabling 
people with physical and intellectual impairments to participate in society. 
That said, psychological counselling, respite care and home care are also 
key supports, and so it is not that Canada has stopped discriminating, it is 
that Canada is now discriminating against a smaller number of people with 
disabilities or health conditions. 
Health supports, like pharmaceuticals, remain included in the health 
care cost calculations, despite medications being necessary for many 
people to regulate the nature of their disabilities. So while Canada no 
longer counts the cost of supporting a child with ADHD participating in 
education, Canada hangs on to the cost of medication which might be 
required to regulate the ADHD, so that the child can meaningfully and 
successfully participate in education, as well as the cost of respite care 
which a family member might need so as to properly support the child.
More to the point, the Minister describes the new policy as taking 
“steps to bring the excessive demands policy in line with our values 
around inclusion and participation, while at the same time maintaining 
the balance between facilitating the arrival of skilled immigrants and 
protecting Canada’s publicly funded health care system”93 The message 
here is that our values tolerate discrimination on the basis of intellectual 
92. ?????
93. House of Commons, “Response to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration” 
by Ahmed Hussen (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/
DocumentViewer/en/42-1/CIMM/report-15/response-8512-421-328>.
???? ?????????????????????????
and physical disabilities.94 Otherwise, there would be no ‘balancing’ to 
perform. If our priority was just capping public health and social service 
costs, then Canada would also be eliminating immigrants who make 
lifestyle choices which can be predicted to likely have health care costs 
down the line, such as smokers or obese people, youth who play ice 
hockey, rugby or ringette (which are the sports with the highest concussion 
rates in Canada),95 women who plan to have children, and any child who 
is under the age of one.96 Indeed, anyone who plans to live until they are 
65 is statistically likely to come to incur higher than average health care 
costs, with the ? gures escalating quickly to averaging to over $20,000 
per year for persons over 80.97 The suggestion of prohibiting women who 
plan to start a family, or families that include infants, on the grounds that 
they are statistically likely to incur higher health care and social services 
costs and thus are a burden on society, would likely provoke a strong sense 
of wrongful discrimination in the minds of many. The same suggestion, 
when the person is physically impaired on the other hand, leads to a 
discussion about ? nding the right balance—Canada starts with the notion 
that a disabled person is a problem. This is to say, the provisions continue 
the obsession with preventing those with existing identi? able physical 
and psychosocial/intellectual conditions or disabilities from becoming 
citizens, while giving a free rein to those whose live style choices—or even 
predicted life span—will likely incur higher costs. The cost justi? cation, 
and the reference to ‘balancing,’ shows the troubling and continuing 
normalization of positioning disabled persons as a presumptive category 
of unwanted citizens. 
There is also a matter of willful blindness when it comes to concerns 
about controlling spending. The calculations assume immigrants will 
actually receive the health care or social service supports which the 
medical of? cers anticipate them needing.  Statistics Canada’s data reveals 
that immigrants experience heightened dif? culty accessing specialized 
94. Indeed, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contemplates that it may be permissible 
for the state to discriminate against people on such grounds. While section 15 of the Charter guarantees 
equality rights, such rights can be infringed if a justi? cation test is met. That test is a rigorous one. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether the policy would withstand a Charter challenge. 
Rather, the point is draw out nuances concerning the policy, and the values and assumptions with it 
both relies on and perpetuates.
95. Public Health Agency of Canada, “Concussion in Sport,” online: <www.canada.ca/en/public-
health/services/diseases/concussion-sign-symptoms/concussion-sport-infographic.html>. 
96. Provincial/Territorial government health spending on persons younger than age 1 was an 
estimated $11,037 per capita in 2015. See Canadian Institute for Health Information, ????????????????
????????????????????????????? (Ottawa: CIHI, 2017) at 23. 
97. ??????????????????????????????????, ???? at 27.
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health and ? rst contact services.98 There is copious literature detailing the 
barriers that new immigrants face when seeking social services,99 primary 
health care,100 and mental health services.101 For decades there have been 
initiatives to try to counter these trends, but the underutilization persists.102
For the Minister to suggest that Canada needs to watch out for migrants 
causing a health care or social services demand crisis is somewhat 
disconnected with the reality of structural barriers and systemic underuse. 
It once again suggests that unfounded assumptions are being drawn upon 
as evidence to support policies that are really about excluding the disabled.
? ?????????
The decision to retain the excessive demands provision is disconnected 
from the reality of Canada’s experiences when we practice inclusion. 
Sponsored spouses and dependent children, and those granted asylum, 
have all been exempted from the provision since 2001. No suggestion 
has been made that this has placed the sustainability of our health and 
social services system into jeopardy. The closest comment to this was the 
bizarre concern of the ED, described earlier but without any evidence, 
that immigrants who would be medically inadmissible may marry or get 
adopted so as to ? t into the exemption. Indeed, the number of people who 
are ultimately declined on medical inadmissibility grounds is strikingly 
low. From 2013 to 2016 an average of 361 applicants a year were denied 
due to being found medically inadmissible on the grounds of excessive 
98. Statistics Canada, ??????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????? ????? ????????? ??? ??????, 
by Janine Clarke, Catalogue no.82-624-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 6 December 2016), online: 
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/82-624-x/2016001/article/14683-eng.htm>.
99. Miriam Stewart et al, “Challenges and barriers to services for immigrant seniors in Canada: ‘you 
are among others but you feel alone’” (2011) 7:1 Int’l J Migration, Health & Social Care 16; Melissa 
Fellin et al, “Barriers and facilitators to health and social service access and utilization for immigrant 
parents raising a child with a physical disability” (2013) 9:3 Int’l J Migration, Health & Social Care 
135.
100. S Ahmed et al, “Barriers to access to primary care by immigrant populations in Canada: a 
literature review” (2015) 18:6 J Immigrant & Minority Health 1.
101. A Durbin et al, ”Mental health service use by recent immigrants from different world regions and 
by non-immigrants in Ontario, Canada: a cross-sectional study” (2015) 15:1 BMC Health Services 
Research 1; Mental Health Commission of Canada, ????????? ???????????????????????? ????????? ???
???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 
(Ottawa: Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2016).
102. For example, in 2003 the author was appointed to Nova Scotia‘s Metropolitan Immigrant 
Settlement Association’s “Task Force on Newcomer Access to Health Care in Nova Scotia” as a 
project mentor, and then served on the steering committee. Our mandate was to engage in research and 
consultation to help identify and address the reasons why recent immigrants experienced challenges 
with accessing health care. Several more recent initiatives are detailed in Anjana Aery, “Innovations to 
Champion Access to Primary Care for Immigrants and Refugees” (Toronto: Wellesley Institute: March 
2017).
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demands.103 The cost to the IRCC to exclude some 361 people a year 
is estimated to be between $800,000 and $1,100,000 per year.104 What 
justi? es mobilizing and now sustaining this sort of apparatus against 
would be immigrants?
Part of the answer is stigma and scapegoating. Writing back in 2000, 
about Canada’s proposal to require the mandatory exclusion of persons 
with HIV/AIDS from immigrating, the HIV/AIDS network drew on the 
work of bioethicist Barry Hoffmaster who commented:
 …the ? nancial pressures being exerted on Canada’s health care system 
make every avenue for controlling costs appealing, it is not clear how 
or whether these pressures would be eased by barring prospective 
immigrants who are HIV-positive…
The overall demand for health services in Canada is driven by much 
bigger and more powerful forces, including the aging of the population; 
the ever-expanding array of expensive pharmaceutical and technological 
interventions; the failure of health promotion efforts to have signi? cant 
impacts on behaviour such as smoking; and the expectations of the public 
and health care professionals. Genuine attempts to address the perceived 
health care crisis should be directed at these forces, and not de? ected by 
worries about the ‘excessive demands’ that immigrants might impose on 
health care services.105
Excessive demands are present in the Canadian health care and social 
services system, and they do require attention. However, their sources 
are factors including insuf? ciently regulated drug promotion and 
pricing practices,106 and state failure to aggressively pursue population 
health initiatives grounded in the social determinants of health.107 The 
externalization of excessive demands—as something which is dangerously 
ampli? ed by foreigners—is somewhat disingenuous. 
Costs also arise due to the legacy of decades of discriminatory 
practices against those who are impaired. These practices have generated 
an extensive infrastructure and culture of exclusion, which is costly to 
103. Building an Inclusive Canada, supra note 52 at 26.
104. Building an Inclusive Canada, ibid at 15, 27.
105. B Hoffmaster & T Schrecker, “An Ethical Analysis of the Mandatory Exclusion of Refugees and 
immigrants who Test HIV-Positive” (Halifax: The Names Project, 2000) at 20, as cited in Alana Klein, 
HIV/AIDS and Immigration: Final Report (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network) at 57. 
106. Ray Moynihan & Alan Cassels, Selling Sickness: How the World’s Biggest Pharmaceutical 
Companies are Turning Us All Into Patients (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2006).
107. See for example, Dennis Raphael, Ann Curry-Stevens & Toba Bryant, “Barriers to addressing 
the social determinants of health: Insights from the Canadian Experience” (2008) 88:2 Health Policy 
222; Jacqueline Low & Luc Theriault, “Health promotion policy in Canada: lessons forgotten, lessons 
still to learn” (2008) 23:2 Health Promotion International 200 at 200-202.
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remedy, but for both legal and moral reasons must be addressed. To target 
361 immigrants a year, who themselves or their families are selected for 
their economic potential, for extra scrutiny on the basis of their or their 
family members’ health conditions and physical and mental disabilities, 
misses the forest for the trees. As Judith Mosoff put it over a decade ago, 
“immigration rules that govern the ways an outsider becomes an insider 
re? ect the moral priorities of the nation.”108 Our rules suggest that our 
moral priorities continue to be unduly swayed by scapegoating practices 
and values that were born in an era of eugenics. They further suggest that 
Canada remains comfortable viewing the impaired as outsiders who will 
only begrudgingly be permitted to belong. 
108. Mosoff, ????? note 12 at para 57.
